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Abstract
We study a rating system in which a set of individ-
uals (e.g., the customers of a restaurant) evaluate
a given service (e.g, the restaurant), with their ag-
gregated opinion determining the probability of all
individuals to use the service and thus its generated
revenue. We explicitly model the influence relation
by a social network, with individuals being influ-
enced by the evaluation of their trusted peers. On
top of that we allow a malicious service provider
(e.g., the restaurant owner) to bribe some individ-
uals, i.e., to invest a part of his or her expected in-
come to modify their opinion, therefore influenc-
ing his or her final gain. We analyse the effect of
bribing strategies under various constraints, and we
show under what conditions the system is bribery-
proof, i.e., no bribing strategy yields a strictly pos-
itive expected gain to the service provider.
1 Introduction
Imagine to be the owner of a new and still relatively unknown
restaurant. The quality of food is not spectacular and the cus-
tomers you have seen so far are only limited to a tiny number
of friends of yours. Your account on Tripadvisor R  has re-
ceived no review and your financial prospects look grim at
best. There is one easy solution to your problems: you ask
your friends to write an enthusiastic review for you, in ex-
change for a free meal. After this, Tripadvisor R  lists your
restaurant as excellent and the number of customers, together
with your profit, suddenly florishes.
Systems such as Tripadvisor R , where a small proportion
of customers writes reviews and influences a large number
of potential customers, are not bribery-proof: each restaurant
owner - or the owner of whichever service - is able to offer
a compensation - monetary or not - in exchange for positive
evaluation, having an impact on the whole set of potential
customers. Tripadvisor R  is based on what we call “Objective
Rating”, or O-RATING: individual evaluations are aggregated
into a single figure, which is seen by, and thus influences,
every potential customer.
What we study in this paper is a system in which each indi-
vidual only receives the evaluation given by the set of trusted
peers, his or her friends, and only this aggregated opinion
influences his or her decision. This is what we call “Per-
sonalised Rating”, or P-RATING, which can be seen a gen-
eralisation of O-RATING in which influence has a complex
network-structure. So, while in the case of O-RATING the
restaurant owner knows exactly how influence flows among
the customers, this might not be the case with P-RATING.
Our contribution We analyse the effect of bribing strate-
gies in the case of O-RATING and P-RATING under various
constraints, depending on the presence of customers who do
not express any opinion and the knowledge of the network
by the service provider: the exact network is known, the net-
work is known but not the customers’ exact position, the net-
work is completely unknown. We show under what condi-
tions the system is bribery-proof, i.e., there is no bribe yield-
ing a strictly positive expected gain to the service provider,
and we provide algorithms for the computation of (all) opti-
mal bribing strategies when they exist.
Intuitively, being able to know and bribe influential cus-
tomers is crucial for guaranteeing a positive expected reward
of a bribing strategy. However, while with large populations
of non-voters “random” bribes can still be profitable, the ef-
fect of P-RATING is largely different from that of O-RATING
and, as we show, the expected profit in the former can be
severely limited and drops below zero in all networks, under
certain (mild) conditions on the cost of bribes.
Our study can be applied to all situations in which individu-
als influence one another in the opinion they give and bribery
can have a disruptive role in determining collective decisions.
Related research lines Our approach relates to several re-
search lines in artificial intelligence, game theory and (com-
putational) social choice [Brandt et al., 2015].
Network-based voting and mechanism design We study
social networks in which individuals’ local decisions
can be manipulated to modify the resulting global prop-
erties. A similar approach is taken by Apt and Markakis
[2014] and Simon and Apt [2015], which study the
changes on a social network needed to make a certain
product adopted among users. Further contributions
include rational secret sharing and multi-party computa-
tion [Abraham et al., 2006], the strategic manipulation
of peer reviews [Kurokawa et al., 2015], and the growing
literature on voting in social networks [Conitzer, 2012;
Salehi-Abari and Boutilier, 2014; Elkind, 2014;
Tsang et al., 2015; Procaccia et al., 2015].
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Lobbying and Bribery Our framework features an external
agent trying to influence individual decisions to reach his
or her private objectives. Lobbying in decision-making
is an important problem in the area of social choice,
from the seminal contribution of [Helpman and Pers-
son, 1998] to more recent studies in multi-issue vot-
ing [Christian et al., 2007]. Lobbying and bribery are
also established concepts in computational social choice,
with their computational complexity being analysed ex-
tensively [Faliszewski et al., 2009; Baumeister et al.,
2011; Bredereck et al., 2014; 2016].
Reputation-based systems We study the aggregation of
possibly insincere individual evaluations by agents that
can influence one another through trust relations. In this
sense ours can be seen as a study of reputation in Multi
Agent Systems, which has been an important concern of
MAS for the past decades [Conte and Paolucci, 2002;
Sabater and Sierra, 2005; Garcin et al., 2009]. In partic-
ular, our framework treats reputation as a manipulable
piece of information, not just a static aggregate of indi-
vidual opinions, coherently with the work of Conte et al.
[2008] and Pinyol and Sabater-Mir [2013].
Paper structure Section 2 presents the basic setup, intro-
ducingO-RATING, P-RATING and bribing strategies. Section 3
focusses on O-RATING, studying its bribery-proofness under
various knowledge conditions. Section 4 evaluates P-RATING
against the same knowledge conditions. In Section 5 we com-
pare the two systems, taking the cost of bribery into account.
We conclude by summarising the main findings and pointing
at future research directions (Section 6).
2 Basic setup
In this section we provide the basic formal definitions.
2.1 Restaurant and customers
Our framework features an object r, called restaurant, be-
ing evaluated by a finite non-empty set of individuals C =
{c1, . . . , cn}, called customers. Customers are connected by
an undirected graph E ✓ C ⇥ C, called the customers net-
work. Given c 2 C we call N(c) = {x 2 C | (c, x) 2 E}
the neighbourhood of c, always including c itself.
Customers concurrently submit an evaluation of the restau-
rant, drawn from a set of values Val ✓ [0, 1], together with a
distinguished element {⇤}, symbolising no opinion. Exam-
ples of values are the set [0, 1] itself, or a discrete assignment
of 1 to 5 stars, as common in online rating systems. We make
the assumption that {0, 1} ✓ Val and that Val is closed under
the operation min{1, x + y} for all x, y 2 Val. The vast ma-
jority of known rating methods can be mapped onto the [0, 1]
interval and analysed within our framework.
We represent the evaluation of the customers as a function
eval : C ! Val [ {⇤} and define V ✓ C as the subset
of customers that expresses an evaluation over the restaurant,
i.e., V = {c 2 C | eval(c) 6= ⇤}. We refer to this set as the
set of voters and we assume it to be always non-empty, i.e.,
there is at least one customer that expresses an evaluation.
2.2 Two rating systems
In online rating systems such as Tripadvisor R  every inter-
ested customer can see - and is therefore influenced by - (the
average of) what the other customers have written. We call
this method O-RATING, which stands for objective rating.
Given an evaluation function eval of a restaurant, the asso-
ciated O-RATING is defined as follows:
O-RATING(eval) = avg
c2V
eval(c)
Where avg is the average function across real-valued eval(c),
disregarding ⇤. We omit eval when clear from the context.
O-RATING flattens individual evaluations into a unique ob-
jective aggregate, the rating that a certain restaurant is given.
What we propose is a refinement of O-RATING, which takes
the network of influence into account. In this system cus-
tomers are only interested in the evaluation of other cus-
tomers they can trust, e.g., their friends. We call our method
P-RATING, which stands for personalised rating. It is defined
for a pair customer-evaluation (c, eval) as follows:
P-RATING(c, eval) = avg
k2N(c)\V
eval(k)
So the P-RATING(c, eval) calculates what customer c comes
to think of the restaurant, taking the average of the opinions
of the customers c is connected to. Again we omit eval when-
ever clear from the context.
Observe that in case a customer has no connection with a
voter, then P-RATING is not defined. To facilitate the analy-
sis we make the technical assumption that each customer is
connected to at least one voter. Also observe that when E =
C⇥C, i.e., in case the network is complete and each individ-
ual is influenced by each other individual, then for all c 2 C
and eval we have that P-RATING(c, eval) = O-RATING(eval).
2.3 Utilities and strategies
We interpret a customer evaluation as a measure of his or her
propensity to go to the restaurant. We therefore assume that
the utility that a restaurant gets is proportional to its rating.
To simplify the analysis we assume a factor 1 proportionality.
The case ofO-RATING. For theO-RATING, we assume that
the initial utility u0 of the restaurant is defined as:
u0O = |C|O-RATING(eval).
Intuitively, the initial utility amounts to the number of cus-
tomers that actually go to the restaurant, weighted with their
(average) predisposition.
At the initial stage of the game, the restaurant owner re-
ceives u0, and can then decide to invest a part of it to influence
a subset of customers and improve upon the initial gain. We
assume utility to be fully transferrable and, to facilitate the
analysis, that such transfers translate directly into changes of
customers’ predispositions.
Definition 1. A strategy is a function   : C ! Val such thatP
c2C  (c)  u0.
Definition 1 imposes that strategies are budget balanced,
i.e., restaurants can only pay with resources they have.
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Let ⌃ be the set of all strategies. We denote  0 the strategy
that assigns 0 to all customers and we call bribing strategy
any strategy that is different from  0. After the execution of
a bribing strategy, the evaluation is updated as follows:
Definition 2. The evaluation eval (c) after execution of   is
eval (c) = min{1, eval(c) +  (c)}, where ⇤+  (c) =  (c),
if  (c) 6= 0, and ⇤+  (c) = ⇤, if  (c) = 0.
In this definition we are making the assumption that the effect
of bribing a non-voter to vote is equivalent to that of bribing
a voter that had a 0-level review, as, intuitively, the individual
has no associated predisposition to go to the restaurant.
A strategy is called efficient if  (c) + eval(c)  1 for all
c 2 C. Let B( ) = {c 2 C |  (c) 6= 0} be the set of bribed
customers. Let V   be the set of voters after the execution
of  . Executing   induces the following change in utility:
u O = |C|O-RATING(eval ) 
X
c2C
 (c).
Intuitively, u O is obtained by adding to the initial utility of
the restaurant the rating obtained as an effect of the money in-
vested on each individual minus the amount of money spent.
We define the revenue of a strategy   as the marginal utility
obtained by executing it:
Definition 3. Let   be a strategy. The revenue of   is defined
as rO( ) = u O u0. We say that   is profitable if rO( ) > 0.
Finally, we recall the standard notion of dominance:
Definition 4. A strategy   is weakly dominant if u O   u 
0
O
for all  02⌃. It is strictly dominant if u O > u 
0
O for all  2⌃.
Hence a non-profitable strategy is never strictly dominant.
The case of P-RATING. The previous definitions can be
adapted to the case of P-RATING as follows:
u0P =
X
c2C
P-RATING(c, eval)
which encodes the initial utility of each restaurant, and
u P =
X
c2C
P-RATING(c, eval ) 
X
c2C
 (c)
which encodes the utility change after the execution of a  .
Finally, let the revenue of   be rP( ) = u P u0P. If clear from
the context, we use P-RATING (c) for P-RATING(eval , c).
In order to determine the dominant strategies, we need to
establish how the customers vote, how they are connected,
and what the restaurant owner knows. In this paper we as-
sume that the restaurant knows eval, leaving the interesting
case when eval is unknown to future work. We focus instead
on the following cases: the restaurant knows the network, the
restaurant knows the shape of the network but not the individ-
uals’ position, and the network is unknown. We analyse the
effect of bribing strategies on P-RATING in each such case.
Notice how for the case of O-RATING the cases collapse to
the first. We also look at the special situation in which every
customer is a voter.
Given a set of such assumptions, we say thatO-RATING (or
P-RATING) are bribery-proof under those assumptions if  0 is
weakly dominant.
Discussion Our model is built upon a number of simpli-
fying assumptions which do not play a significant role in the
results and could therefore be dispensed with: (i) customers’
ratings correspond to their propensity to go to the restaurant.
(ii) the restaurant utility equals the sum of all such propen-
sities (iii) bribe  (c) affects evaluation eval(c) linearly. All
these assumptions could be generalised by multiplicative fac-
tors, such as an average price R paid at the restaurant, and a
“customer price” Dc, such that eval (c) = eval(c) +
 (c)
Dc
.
3 Bribes under O-RATING
In this section we look at bribing strategies under O-RATING,
first focussing on the case where everyone expresses an opin-
ion, then moving on to the more general case.
3.1 All vote
Let us now consider the case in which V = C. Recall that
B( ) is the set of customers bribed by  . We say that two
strategies  1 and  2 are disjoint if B( 1) [ B( 2) = ;. By
direct calculation it follows that the revenue of disjoint strate-
gies exhibits the following property:
Lemma 1. If V = C and  1 and  2 are two disjoint strate-
gies, then rO( 1    2) = rO( 1) + rO( 2).
We now show that bribing a single individual is not profitable.
Lemma 2. Let   be a bribing strategy, V = C and |B( )| =
1. Then, rO( )  0, i.e.,   is not profitable.
Proof sketch. Let c¯ be the only individual such that  (c¯) 6= 0.
By calculation, r( ) = u O u0O = O-RATING  O-RATING P
c  (c) = min{1, eval(c¯)+ (c¯)} eval(c¯)  (c¯)  0.
By combining the two lemmas above we are able to show that
no strategy is profitable for bribing the O-RATING.
Proposition 3. If V = C, then no strategy is profitable.
Proof sketch. Any bribing strategy   can be decomposed into
n pairwise disjoint strategies such that   =  c1   · · ·  cn and|B( cj )| = 1 for all 1  j  n. By applying Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 we then obtain that rO( )  0.
From this it follows that  0 is weakly dominant and thus
O-RATING bribery-proof when all customers voted.
3.2 Non-voters
Let us now consider the case of V ⇢ C, i.e., when there is at
least one customer who is not a voter. In this case Lemma 1
no longer holds, as shown in the following example.
Example 1. Let C = {A,B,C}, and let eval(A) = 0.5,
eval(B) = 0.5, and eval(C) = ⇤. The initial resources are
u0 = O-RATING ⇥ 3 = 1.5. Let now  1(A) = 0.5 and
 1(B) =  1(C) = 0, and let  2(C) = 0.5 and  2(A) =
 2(B) = 0. Now u 1O = 0.75 ⇥ 3   0.5 = 1.75 and u 2O =
0.5⇥ 3  0.5 = 1, but u 1  2O = 0.6¯⇥ 3  1 = 1.
The example (in particular  1) also shows that O-RATING
in this case is not bribery-proof.
We now turn to characterise the set of undominated bribing
strategies. We begin by showing that bribing a non-voter is
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always dominated. Let first   be a strategy such that  (c¯) 6= 0
for some c 2 C \V and recall that V   is the set of voters after
execution of  . Let us define the c-greedy restriction of   to
be any strategy   c¯ such that:
• V   c¯ = V   \ {c}, i.e., the greedy restriction eliminates
c¯ from the set of voters.
• For each c 2 V   \ c, max(1, eval(c) +  (c)) =
max(1, eval(c) +   c¯(c)), i.e., the greedy restriction
does not waste further resources.
• If there exists c 2 V   \c such that eval(c)+  c¯(c) < 1
then
P
c2C  
 c¯(c) =
P
c2C  (c), i.e., the  
 c¯ redis-
tributes  (c¯) among the remaining voters.
We now show that each strategy bribing a non-voter is strictly
dominated by any of its greedy restrictions.
Proposition 4. Let V 6= C, and c¯ 2 C \ V . Then each
strategy   with  (c) 6= 0 is strictly dominated by   c¯.
Proof. Let   be a strategy with  (c) 6= 0 for some non-voter
c, and let   c¯ be one of its greedy restriction defined above.
u 
 c¯
O   u O =
|C|(O-RATING  c¯ O-RATING )+
X
c2C
 (c) 
X
c2C
  c¯(c) =
|C|(
P
c2C eval
  c¯ (c)
|V |  
P
c2C eval
 (c)
|V [ c| ) +
+(
X
c2C
 (c) 
X
c2C
  c¯(c))
Observe first that   c¯ is a redistribution, hence
P
c  (c)  P
c  
 c¯(c)   0, i.e., the second addendum in the above
equation is positive. Consider now the case where there ex-
ists c 2 V   \ c such that eval(c) +   c¯(c) < 1. Then
by the definition of   c¯ we have that
P
c2V   eval
 (c) =P
c2V   c¯ eval
  c¯(c), i.e., the greedy restriction preserves
the overall evaluation. By straightforward calculation this en-
tails that u 
 c¯
O   u O > 0. If no such c exists, and therefore
O-RATING 
 c¯
= 1 we have that either O-RATING  < 1 or,
by the efficiency requirement and the fact that  (c) 6= 0, we
have that
P
c2C  (c) >
P
c2C  
 c¯(c). In either cases we
have that u 
 c¯
O   u O > 0.
Let an O-greedy strategy be any efficient strategy that re-
distributes all the initial resources u0O among voters. Making
use of the previous result, we are able to characterise the set
of all dominant strategies for O-RATING.
Proposition 5. Let V 6= C. A strategy is weakly dominant
for O-RATING if and only if it is an O-greedy strategy.
Proof sketch. For the right-to-left direction, first observe that
all O-greedy strategies are payoff-equivalent, and that a non-
efficient strategy is always dominated by its efficient counter-
part. By Proposition 4 we know that strategies bribing non-
voters are dominated, and by straightforward calculations we
obtain that in presence of non-voters it is always profitable
to bribe as much as possible. For the left-to-right direction,
observe that a non-greedy strategy is either inefficient, or it
bribes a non-voter, or does not bribe as much as possible. In
either circumstance it is strictly dominated.
While there may be cases in which the number of weakly
dominant strategies under O-RATING is exponential, all such
strategies are revenue equivalent, and Proposition 5 gives us
a polynomial algorithm to find one of them: starting from an
evaluation vector eval, distribute all available resources u0O
to the voters, without exceeding the maximal evaluation of 1.
By either exhausting the available budget or distributing it all,
we are guaranteed the maximum gain by Proposition 5.
4 Bribes under P-RATING
In this section we look at bribing strategies under P-RATING,
against various knowledge conditions on the social network.
As for Section 3 we start by looking at the case where every-
one votes and later on allowing non-voters. Before doing that,
we introduce a useful graph-theoretic measure of influence.
Definition 5. The influence weight of a customer c 2 C in a
network E is defined as follows:
wc =
X
k2N(c)\V
1
|N(k) \ V |
Intuitively, each individual’s rating influences the rating of
each of its connections, and does so with a factor that is
inversely proportional to the number of connections this in-
dividual has. We formalise this statement in the following
lemma, which is restricted to strategies that only bribe voters:
Lemma 6. Let B( ) ✓ V . The utility obtained by playing  
with P-RATING is u P =
P
c2C wc ⇥ eval (c) 
P
c2C  (c).
Proof. By calculation:
u P +
X
c2C
 (c) =
X
c2C
P-RATING(c) =
X
c2C
avg
k2N(c)\V
eval (k) =
=
X
c2C
1
|N(c) \ V |
X
k2N(c)\V
eval (k) =
=
X
c2C
⇥
eval (c)⇥
X
k2N(c)\V
1
|N(k) \ V |
⇤
=
=
X
c2C
wc ⇥ eval (c)
In particular, when V = C, we obtain wc =
P
k2N(c)
1
deg(k) ,
where deg(c) = |N(c)| is the degree of c in E.
4.1 All vote, known network
We begin by studying the simplest case in which the restau-
rant knows the evaluation eval, the network E as well as the
position of each customer on the network. The following
corollary is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 6:
Corollary 7. Let V = C and let  1 and  2 be two disjoint
strategies, then rP( 1    2) = rP( 1) + rP( 2).
We are now able to show a precise characterisation of the
revenue obtained by any efficient strategy  :
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Proposition 8. Let V = C, letE be a known network, and let
  be an efficient strategy. Then rP( ) =
P
c2C(wc  1) (c).
Proof. By calculation, where Step (2) uses Lemma 6, and
Step (4) uses the fact that   is efficient:
rP( ) = u
 
P   u0P = (1)
= [
X
c2C
wc eval c  
X
c2C
 (c) 
X
c2C
wc eval(c)] = (2)
=
X
c2C
⇥
wc [min{1, eval(c) +  (c)}  eval(c)]
⇤  (3)
 
X
c2C
 (c) =
X
c2C
(wc   1) (c). (4)
Proposition 8 tells us that the factors wc are crucial in de-
termining the revenue of a given bribing strategy. Bribing a
customer c is profitable whenever wc>1 (provided its evalua-
tion was not 1 already), while bribing a customer cwithwc1
is at most as profitable as doing nothing, as can be seen in the
example below. Most importantly, it shows that P-RATING is
not bribery-proof when the restaurant knows both the network
and the customers’ evaluations.
Example 2. Let E be a four arms stars, and let A be the
individual in the centre. Assume each individual values the
restaurant 0.5. We have that wA = 2.2 and wc = 0.7 for
all c different from A. Consider now two bribing strategies:
 A which bribes A with 0.5, and  B which bribes a single
individual B 6= A with the same amount. What we obtain is
that rP( A) = 0.6, while rP( B) =  0.15.
Given a network E and an evaluation vector eval, let Algo-
rithm 1 define the P-greedy bribing strategy.
Input: Evaluation function eval and network E
Output: A bribing strategy  GP : C ! Val
Budget=u0P
 GP (c) = 0 for all c 2 C
Compute wc for all c 2 C
Sort c 2 C in descending order c0, . . . , cm based on wc
for i=0,. . . ,m do
if Budget6= 0 then
if wci > 1 then
 GP (ci) = min{1  eval(ci),Budget}
Budget=Budget- GP (ci)
end
end
return  GP
end
Algorithm 1: The P-greedy bribing strategy  GP
As a consequence of Proposition 8 we obtain:
Corollary 9. The P-greedy bribing strategy defined in Algo-
rithm 1 is weakly dominant.
As in the case of O-RATING, Corollary 9 has repercussions
on the computational complexity of bribery: it shows that
computing a weakly dominant strategy can be done in poly-
nomial time. Notice how the most costly operation lies in
the computation of the influence weights wc, which can be
performed only once, assuming the network is static. Simi-
lar problems, such as recognising whether bribing a certain
individual is profitable, or estimating whether individuals on
a network can be bribed above a certain threshold, are also
computable in polynomial time.
4.2 All vote, unknown network
We now move to study the more complex case of an unknown
network. Surprisingly, we are able to show that no bribing
strategy is profitable (in expectation), and hence P-RATING is
bribery-proof in this case. Recall that we are still assuming
that the restaurant knows eval and everybody voted.
We begin by assuming that the restaurant knows the struc-
ture of the network, but not the position of each participant.
Formally, the restaurant knows E, but considers any permu-
tation of the customers in C over E as possible. Let us thus
define the expected revenue of a strategy   over a given net-
work E as the average over all possible permutations of cus-
tomers: E[rP( )] =
P 1
n! [u
 
⇢ u0⇢], where we abuse notation
by writing u ⇢ as u P under permutation ⇢ over the network E.
What we are able to show is that all strategies are at most as
profitable as  0 in expected return:
Proposition 10. Let V = C, let the network structure of E
be known but not the relative positions of customers on E.
Then E[rP( )] = 0 for all strategies  .
Proof sketch. Let |C| = n. We show the result for any strat-
egy   that bribes a single customer c¯. The general state-
ment follows from the linearity of E[r( )]. Equation (5) uses
Proposition 8 to compute the revenue for each permutation ⇢
of customers C on the network:
E[ ] =
X
⇢
1
n!
(u ⇢   u0⇢) =
X
⇢
1
n!
(w⇢(c¯)   1) (c¯) = (5)
=
X
c2C
(n  1)!
n!
(wc   1) (c¯) = (n  1)!
n!
X
c2C
(wc   1) = 0 (6)
The last line follows from the observation that
P
c wc = |C|
and hence
P
c(wc 1) = 0, by a consequence of Definition 5
when everybody votes.
Hence, if we assume a uniform probability over all permu-
tations of customers on the network, a straightforward conse-
quence of Proposition 10 concludes that it is not profitable (in
expectation) to bribe customers.
Corollary 11. If V = C and the network is unknown, then no
bribing strategy for P-RATING is profitable in expected return.
4.3 Non-voters, known network
With P-RATING it is possible to find a network where bribing
a non-voter is profitable:
Example 3. Consider 4 individuals {B,C,D,E} connected
only to a non-voter in the middle. Let eval(j) = 0.2 for all j
but the center. We have u0P = 1. Let A be the non-voter, and
let  1(A) = 1 and 0 otherwise. The utility of  1 is:
P-RATING 1(A) + 4P-RATING 1(j)  1 = 1.76
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A0.2 B0.2
C*
C* A0.2
B0.2
B0.2 C*
A0.2
Figure 1: Customers permutations in Example 4.
All other strategies can be shown to be dominated by  1. Take
for instance a strategy  2 such that  2(B) = 0.8,  2(C) =
0.2 and 0 otherwise. The utility of  2 is u 2P = 1.25.
It is quite hard to obtain analytical results for strategies
bribing non-voters, due to the non-linearity of the P-RATING
in this setting. We can however provide results in line with
those of the previous section if we restrict to voter-only strate-
gies, i.e., strategies   such that  (c) = 0 for all c 62 V . In this
case, a similar proof to Proposition 8 shows the following:
Proposition 12. Let V 6= C, E be a known network, and  
be an efficient bribing strategy such that B( ) ✓ V . Then,
rP( ) =
P
c2C(wc   1) (c).
The difference with the case of V = C is that wc can be
arbitrarily large in the presence of non-voters, such as in our
Example 3.
4.4 Non-voters, unknown positions
Unlike the case of V = C, in this case it is possible to define
bribing strategies that are profitable (in expected return).
Example 4. Let C = {A,B,C}, and the initial evaluation
eval(A) = eval(B) = 0.2 and eval(C) = ⇤. Assume that
the structure of the network is known, but the position of the
individuals is not. Let the three possible network positions
(without counting the symmetries) be depicted in Figure 1.
Let  (B) = 0.2 and  (A) =  (C) = 0. In the first case:
r1P ( )=P-RATING(A) + ...+ P-RATING(C)  0.2  u0P =
= 0.3 + 0.3 + 0.4  0.2  0.6 = 0.2
In the second case r2P( ) = 0 while in the third:
r3P ( ) = 0.4 + 0.3 + 0.2  0.2  0.6 = 0.1
Therefore, P-RATING is not bribery-proof (in expectation)
in the presence of non-voters when the network is unknown.
Interesting computational problems open up in this setting,
such as identifying the networks that allow for profitable brib-
ing strategies, and their expected revenue.
5 Boundaries of bribery-proofness
The previous sections have shown that having a network-
based rating systems, where individuals are influenced by
their peers, is not bribery-proof, even when the position of in-
dividuals in a given network is not known. However bribing
strategies have a different effect in the overall score. While
the utility of O-RATING is a sum of the global average of vot-
ers’ evaluation, the utility of P-RATINGis a sum of local aver-
ages of voters’ evalution against the one of their peers.
Therefore a strategy bribing one voter affects everyone in
the case of O-RATING, but it can be shown to have a limited
effect in the case of P-RATING.
Proposition 13. Let   be an efficient strategy s.t. |B( )| = 1,
and let c¯ be such that  (c) 6= 0. Then rP( ) < N(c¯).
Proof. By calculation, we have that:
rP( ) =
X
c2C
P-RATING (c)  (c¯) 
X
c2C
P-RATING(c) =X
c02N(c¯)
P-RATING (c)   (c¯) 
X
c02N(c¯)
P-RATING(c) 
 1⇥N(c¯)   (c¯) 
X
c02N(c¯)
P-RATING(c) < N(c¯)
The previous result shows that increasing the number of
individuals that are not connected to an agent that is bribed,
even if these are non-voters, does not increase the revenue of
the bribing strategy. This is not true when we use O-RATING.
Proposition 14. Let   be an efficient strategy. The revenue
rO( ) of   is monotonically increasing with the number of
non-voters, and is unbounded.
Proof. It follows from our definitions that:
rO( ) = (
|C|
|V  |   1)
⇥X
c2C
eval(c) +  (c)
⇤
The above figure is unbounded and monotonically increas-
ing in the number of non-voters, which can be obtained by
increasing C keeping V   fixed.
So while P-RATING and O-RATING are not bribery-proof in
general, it turns out that the impact of the two in the overall
network are significantly different. In particular, under realis-
tic assumptions such as a very large proportion of non-voters
and with participants having a few connections, bribing under
O-RATING is increasingly rewarding, while under P-RATING
this is no longer the case.
6 Conclusive remarks
We introduced P-RATING, a network-based rating system
which generalises the commonly used O-RATING, and anal-
ysed their resistance to external bribery under various condi-
tions. The main take-home message of our contribution can
be summarised in one point, deriving from our main results:
P-RATING and O-RATING are not bribery-proof in general.
However, if we assume that a service provider has a cost for
bribing an individual, there are situations in which P-RATING
is fully bribery proof, while O-RATING is not. For instance,
if the cost of bribing an individual c is at least N(c) then
P-RATING is bribery-proof. As observed previously, this is
not necessarily true for O-RATING. In particular, if we as-
sume the presence of unreachable individuals the difference
is more significant. As shown, for P-RATING we need to bribe
individuals with wc > 1. With O-RATING is sufficient to find
one voter who accepts a bribe.
There is a number of avenues open to future research in-
vestigation. The most important ones include the case of par-
tially known customers’ evaluation, and the study of ratings
of multiple restaurants, where the probability of a customer
choosing a restaurant determines his or her probability not to
choose the others.
306
Acknowledgments
Umberto Grandi acknowledges the support of the Labex
CIMI project “Social Choice on Networks” (ANR-11-
LABX-0040-CIMI). Paolo Turrini the support of Imperial
College London for the Junior Research Fellowship Design-
ing negotiation spaces for collective decision-making (DoC-
AI1048). This work has also been partly supported by COST
Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice.
References
[Abraham et al., 2006] I. Abraham, D. Dolev, R. Gonen, and
J. Halpern. Distributed computing meets game theory: ro-
bust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty
computation. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM symposium
on Principles of distributed computing (PODC’06), 2006.
[Apt and Markakis, 2014] Krzysztof R. Apt and Evangelos
Markakis. Social networks with competing products. Fun-
damenta Informaticae, 129(3):225–250, 2014.
[Baumeister et al., 2011] Dorothea Baumeister, Ga´bor
Erde´lyi, and Jo¨rg Rothe. How hard is it to bribe the
judges? A study of the complexity of bribery in judgment
aggregation. In Proceedings of the Second International
Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT-2011),
2011.
[Brandt et al., 2015] Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle
Endriss, Je´roˆme Lang, and Ariel Procaccia, editors. Hand-
book of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2015.
[Bredereck et al., 2014] R. Bredereck, J. Chen, S. Hartung,
S. Kratsch, R. Niedermeier, O. Suchy´, and G. J. Woeg-
inger. A multivariate complexity analysis of lobbying in
multiple referenda. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Re-
search, 50:409–446, 2014.
[Bredereck et al., 2016] Robert Bredereck, Piotr Fal-
iszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, and Nimrod Talmon.
Large-scale election campaigns: Combinatorial shift
bribery. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR),
55:603–652, 2016.
[Christian et al., 2007] R. Christian, M. Fellows, F. Rosa-
mond, and A. Slinko. On complexity of lobbying in mul-
tiple referenda. Review of Economic Design, 11(3):217–
224, 2007.
[Conitzer, 2012] Vincent Conitzer. Should social network
structure be taken into account in elections? Mathemat-
ical Social Sciences, 64(1):100–102, 2012.
[Conte and Paolucci, 2002] Rosaria Conte and Mario
Paolucci. Reputation in Artificial Societies: Social Beliefs
for Social Order. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
[Conte et al., 2008] Rosaria Conte, Mario Paolucci, and
Jordi Sabater-Mir. Reputation for innovating social net-
works. Advances in Complex Systems, 11(2):303–320,
2008.
[Elkind, 2014] Edith Elkind. Coalitional games on sparse so-
cial networks. In 10th International Conference on Web
and Internet Economics (WINE-2014), 2014.
[Faliszewski et al., 2009] Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemas-
paandra, and Lane A. Hemaspaandra. How hard is bribery
in elections? Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
(JAIR), 35:485–532, 2009.
[Garcin et al., 2009] F. Garcin, B. Faltings, and R. Jurca. Ag-
gregating reputation feedback. In Proceedings of the Inter-
national Conference on Reputation, 2009.
[Helpman and Persson, 1998] Elhanan Helpman and Torsten
Persson. Lobbying and legislative bargaining. Working
Paper 6589, National Bureau of Economic Research, June
1998.
[Kurokawa et al., 2015] David Kurokawa, Omer Lev, Jamie
Morgenstern, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Impartial peer re-
view. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, (IJCAI-2015),
pages 582–588, 2015.
[Pinyol and Sabater-Mir, 2013] Isaac Pinyol and Jordi
Sabater-Mir. Computational trust and reputation mod-
els for open multi-agent systems: a review. Artificial
Intelligence Review, 40(1):1–25, 2013.
[Procaccia et al., 2015] Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and
Eric Sodomka. Ranked voting on social networks. In Pro-
ceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence, (IJCAI-2015), 2015.
[Sabater and Sierra, 2005] Jordi Sabater and Carles Sierra.
Review on computational trust and reputation models. Ar-
tificial Intelligence Review, 24(1):33–60, 2005.
[Salehi-Abari and Boutilier, 2014] Amirali Salehi-Abari and
Craig Boutilier. Empathetic social choice on social net-
works. In Proceedings of the 13th International con-
ference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,
(AAMAS-2014), 2014.
[Simon and Apt, 2015] Sunil Simon and Krzysztof R. Apt.
Social network games. Journal of Logic and Computation,
25(1):207–242, 2015.
[Tsang et al., 2015] Alan Tsang, John A. Doucette, and Hadi
Hosseini. Voting with social influence: Using arguments
to uncover ground truth. In Proceedings of the 15th Inter-
national Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multia-
gent Systems, (AAMAS-2015), 2015.
307
